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We propose a double blinding-attack on entangled-based quantum key distribution protocols. The
principle of the attack is the same as in existing blinding attack except that instead of blinding the
detectors on one side only, Eve is blinding the detectors of both Alice and Bob. In the BBM92
protocol, the attack allows Eve to get a full knowledge of the key and remain undetected even
if Alice and Bob are using 100% efficient detectors. The attack can be easily extended to Ekert
protocol, with an efficiency as high as 85.3%.
Practical implementation of Quantum Key Distribu-
tion (QKD) protocols [1] can be subjected to attacks
exploiting the imperfections of the components used by
the two parties (Alice and Bob) who wish to generate
a shared key to encrypt their communication on a pub-
lic channel. Most notable attacks are the time-shift at-
tacks [2, 3] and the blinding-attacks [4–6]. The latter
have demonstrated a full hacking of a QKD protocol, the
eavesdropper (Eve) acquiring the exact knowledge of the
sift key shared by Alice and Bob in a BBM92 protocol
[7].
We propose here an improvement on the existing
blinding-attacks by attacking both sides (Alice and Bob)
instead of one. The advantage of our proposed attack is
that it reaches 100% efficiency on both sides in the case
of BBM92 protocol, and that it can easily be extended
to cover the case of Ekert protocol [8].
I. SINGLE BLINDING-ATTACK
The existing blinding attacks [4–6] on BBM92 protocol
are intercept-and-resend type of attacks. Eve intercepts
the signal intended for Bob, and performs measurements
in random bases to obtain the raw key, as Bob would
have done it.
In order to hide her presence, for each successful mea-
surement result that Eve obtains, she forwards to Bob
a signal that deterministically gives him the exact same
result whenever their measurement basis are the same,
and no result at all (non detection) if they are diagonal
to each others.
To implement this idea with actual QKD devices, Eve
blinds Bob’s detectors to single-photon detection. She
does so with various techniques [5] by forcing the detec-
tors to exit the Geiger mode and enter the linear mode,
in which the detector clicks only when the intensity of
the signal reaching the detectors exceeds the preset dis-
criminator threshold Ith. After each detection, Eve for-
wards a bright pulse linearly polarized along the direction
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corresponding to her own measurement result. When
the bases chosen at random by Eve and Bob are iden-
tical, the pulse deterministically produces a click in one
of Bob’s detectors. Because it is then either entirely re-
flected or entirely transmitted at Bob’s polarizing beam-
splitter, Bob’s measurement results are then the same as
Eve’s. In order to avoid double counts and incorrect re-
sults whenever the bases chosen at random by Eve and
Bob are diagonal to each others, Eve sets the intensity of
the pulses such that it is lower than twice the threshold
intensity in the detectors. The pulse is then split in half
at Bob’s polarizing beamsplitter whenever the bases are
diagonal to each other, so that the output in either of
Bob’s detector is insufficient to overcome the threshold
to produce a click.
The point of the attack is that at the end of the raw
key distribution, Eve owns an exact copy of Bob’s key.
So, if Alice and Bob are satisfied enough with the quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER) measured on a subset of this
key, Eve can listen to the error correction protocol that
they implement and perform the exact same operations
as Bob, and can obtain in the end an exact copy of the
sifted key [6].
A weakness of single blinding-attacks is that Bob’s key
is on average half the size that he would have normally
obtained in the absence of an attack, because in about
half of the cases the bases chosen at random by Eve and
Bob turn out to be diagonal to each others, and Bob’s
detectors do not click: the efficiency of this attack is by
design fundamentally limited to 50% on Bob’s side.
Another weakness is that extending this type of attack
to cover the case of Ekert protocol is not straightforward.
To the best of our knowledge, actual attacks against Ek-
ert protocol have yet to be implemented with real devices,
and proposals to do so are not entirely satisfactory. For
instance, in a proposal using blinding attack [4], rates of
coincidences that would be expected equal from a genuine
source of entangled state differ significantly, and that is
something that Alice and Bob would not fail to notice.
The double blinding-attack that we propose here ad-
dresses these two weaknesses. The idea is simply to
launch a blinding attack on both sides and to drive de-
tection patterns inspired by existing local realist models.
2II. DOUBLE BLINDING-ATTACK
Regardless of the protocol used by Alice and Bob
(BBM92 or Ekert), the implementation of a double
blinding-attack on each side is similar to that of a single
blinding attack, except that Eve is blinding all detec-
tors instead of only those on Bob’s side. Any practical
implementation of a QKD protocol that is vulnerable to
blinding-attacks [4–6] would thus be immediately vulner-
able as well to our proposed attack.
A crucial difference however in the spirit of the attack
is that it is not an intercept-and-resend attack: Eve is not
measuring anything from the genuinely entangled source
that was initially intended for Alice and Bob, let alone us-
ing any information that she could possibly extract from
this source. Eve is blocking instead this entangled source
altogether and replacing it entirely by tailored pairs of
bright pulses.
To be more specific, Eve is sending pairs of bright
pulses, with intensity IA and polarization λA for Alice,
and intensity IB and polarization λB for Bob, with the
condition
λA = λB − pi
2
= λ,
which guarantees that the measurement results will be
correlated.
Eve is randomizing the polarization λ from one pulse
to the other, using a uniform distribution on the circle in
order to obtain an attack that is rotationally invariant,
both at the single count level and at the coincidence count
level.
Consider Alice’s side. By Malus law, the intensity of a
pulse linearly polarized along λ reaching the detectors 0
and 1 at the output of the polarizing beam-splitter (PBS)
oriented along θA is:


IA,0 = IA cos
2(λ− θA) = IA 1 + cos 2(λ− θA)
2
IA,1 = IA sin
2(λ− θA) = IA 1− cos 2(λ− θA)
2
(1)
Once it is forced to exit the Geiger mode, a detec-
tor clicks in the linear mode only if the signal intensity
reaching this detector is greater than the threshold Ith
that was set for the Geiger mode [5]. For simplicity we
assume that the threshold is the same in all detectors. A
click is triggered in detector i if the intensity IA,i is such
that
IA,i > Ith, (2)
and similarly on Bob’s side the condition to obtain a click
in detector i is
IB,i > Ith. (3)
As we will see, for a given threshold Ith, the only pa-
rameter that Eve needs to adjust is the brightness of the
pulses, depending on which protocol Alice and Bob are
implementing.
A. Attack on BBM92 protocol
In the BBM92 protocol [7], the security of the key is
supposed to be guaranteed by a low enough QBER. The
idea is that any measurement performed by Eve meant to
extract some information from a source of genuinely en-
tangled photons would necessarily introduce errors in the
perfect (anti)correlation predicted for the singlet state.
In the double blinding-attack, Eve is bypassing this
difficulty by creating a source from scratch in which she
has a full knowledge of the polarization and intensity of
the pulses.
The idea of the attack is to adjust the bright pulses
such that the detection pattern behaves exactly like John
Bell’s local hidden-variable model [9], which was meant to
reproduce the perfect correlation predicted for identical
measurement directions on a singlet state [10].
Eve does so by adjusting the intensity of her bright
pulses such that they have twice the threshold intensity
Ith to obtain a click in a detector:
IA = IB = 2 Ith.
Then, on Alice’s side, the condition (2) to obtain a
click with the outputs (1) becomes:
{
cos 2(λ− θA) > 0 for a click in channel 0,
− cos 2(λ− θA) > 0 for a click in channel 1.
(4)
Counting a click in channel 0 as a +1 and a click in
channel 1 as a −1, the measurement result A for Alice
takes the form
A(θA, λ) = sign cos 2(λ− θA). (5)
Similarly, for the same pulse, the pi/2 shift in polariza-
tion on Bob’s side leads to a measurement result of the
form
B(θB, λ) = −sign cos 2(λ− θB). (6)
For a uniform distribution of λ over the circle, it leads to
a correlation of the form
E(θB, θA) = −1 + 4
pi
|θB − θA|, (7)
where |θB − θA| ∈ [−pi2 ,+pi2 ].
The detection pattern of this attack is nothing but that
of the local hidden-variable model given by John Bell in
his 1964 article [9], except that the angles given here are
half of those given by Bell because he was considering the
singlet state for spin 1/2 particles when we are consider-
ing photons. A representation in Poincare´ sphere would
have given us exactly the same angle dependence.
The important property of this attack for the BBM92
protocol is that whenever Alice and Bob are performing
the same measurements θ = θA = θB, the correlation is
E(θ, θ) = −1, (8)
3which means that their results are perfectly anticorre-
lated, exactly as predicted for the singlet state for identi-
cal measurements. This perfect correlation for identical
measurement is all that is needed to achieve a low QBER
in a BBM92 protocol.
It is worth noticing here that the conditions to obtain
a click in a detector are mutually exclusive, so that there
are no double-counts. Even more crucial is that there
is always at least one detector that clicks, except in the
case of λ = θA, which can be ignored since it is a null set,
so that the detection efficiency on each side is in effect
equal to 100%.
Blinding attacks against the BBM92 protocol are
therefore unrelated to the detection loophole, contrary to
what was usually thought. The effectiveness of the dou-
ble blinding-attack rather highlights the intrinsic weak-
ness of the BBM92 protocol which is only probing the
perfect correlation in identical bases, something that
is always accessible to local realist models (with Bertl-
mann’s socks type models).
B. Attack on Ekert protocol
In Ekert protocol, the security of the key is guaranteed
by measuring a high enough violation of Bell inequalities
[8, 15]. Extending the attack against BBM92 protocol to
cover the case of Ekert protocol is straightforward. All
Eve needs to do is lower the intensity of the pulses sent on
one side (say, on Alice’s side), such that Ith < IA < 2Ith.
On the other side (Bob’s side), the pulses are the same as
in the attack on the BBM92 protocol, that is IB = 2Ith,
so that the detection pattern remains as in Eq. (6).
The simple consequence of these less bright pulses on
Alice’s side is that they do not always generate a click
in one of Alice’s detectors. This is enough to let her
enter the realm of the detection loophole, and leads to
an apparent violation of Bell inequalities on the sample
of detected pulses (see [14] and reference therein for an
account on the importance of the discriminator threshold
in the context of Bell inequalities violations). The lower
the intensity IA with respect to the fixed threshold Ith,
the more pulses fail to trigger a pulse and the higher the
violation of Bell inequalities measured on the sample of
detected pulses [14].
Setting the intensity of the pulses on Alice’s side such
that
IA cos
2 α = Ith,
the condition (2) to obtain a click on Alice’s side becomes:
{
cos 2(λ− θA) > cos 2α for a click in channel 0,
− cos 2(λ− θA) > cos 2α for a click in channel 1.
(9)
so that whenever the condition
− cos 2α < cos 2(λ− θA) < cos 2α (10)
is fulfilled, neither detector clicks.
Counting a click in channel 0 as a +1, a click in channel
1 as a −1, and a non-detection as 0, the measurement
result A for Alice becomes:


A(θA, λ) = 0 when α < |λ− θA| < pi
2
− α,
A(θA, λ) = −sign cos 2(λ− θA) otherwise,
(11)
for (λ− θA) ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2], and the correlation measured
by Alice and Bob on the sample of detected pulses then
takes the form


E(θB, θA) = −1 for 0 ≤ |θB − θA| < pi
4
− α,
E(θB, θA) = +1 for
pi
4
+ α < |θB − θA| < pi
2
,
E(θB, θA) =
1
α
(|θB − θA| − pi
4
)
otherwise,
(12)
for (θB − θA) ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2].
With α = pi
4
√
2
, the above correlation leads to a cor-
relation with magnitude
√
2
2
for the angle differences
|θB−θA| = pi8+k pi4 used in Ekert protocol, and that means
a violation of the Bell-CHSH inequalities measured on the
sample of detected pulses of SCHSH = 2
√
2, which is the
maximum predicted by Quantum Mechanics for a singlet
state [15].
It is worth noticing that this attack designed for Ekert
protocol works without change if Alice and Bob perform
a BBM92 protocol instead, because the correlation given
by Eqs. (12) when they perform identical measurement
is equal to −1.
Note also that, thanks to the rotational invariance of
the source, the marginal probabilities are equal and in-
dependent of the settings, and the correlation function
depends only on the angle difference between the mea-
surement performed by Alice and Bob, and not on their
absolute values. The only way to spot this attack by look-
ing at the statistics of the detected events would therefore
consists in monitoring the detection efficiencies.
On the side receiving the weaker pulses (here Alice’s
side) it is straightforward, using Eqs. (11), to evaluate
the probability of detection pw for a uniform distribution
of the polarization λ:
pw = 1− 2
pi
∫ pi
2
−α
α
dλ =
4α
pi
, (13)
that is, pw =
1√
2
with α = pi
4
√
2
.
On the side receiving the stronger pulses (here on Bob’s
side) the probability of detection is equal to 1, so that this
imbalance could reveal Eve’s attack if left as such. She
can however hide this behavior by sending alternatively
(or randomly) the weaker pulse on either Alice’s side or
Bob’s side. Then the detection efficiency η, which is the
probability for a pulse to be detected on either output
channel, becomes the average of the probability to detect
4a strong or a weak pulse, that is,
η =
1
2
(1 + pw) =
1
4
(
√
2 + 2) ≈ 0.853. (14)
This efficiency is greater than the efficiency bound of
82.8% above which no local realist model reaching the
maximum violation of Bell-CHSH inequalities predicted
by Quantum Mechanics exists [12, 16].
In order to explain this seemingly surprising behavior,
a first point to notice is that the non-detections are not
independent in this attack: there is always at most one
pulse that remains undetected, the strong one being al-
ways detected. So, the proof of the bound given by Garg
and Mermin [16] simply does not apply here.
A second important point is how the efficiency is ac-
tually defined and estimated. It is known that assuming
the independence of non-detections is not a necessary
condition to derive the bound [12], but it is then estab-
lished for a conditional efficiency η2,1: the probability for
a photon to be detected on one side given that its corre-
sponding photon (from the same pair) was detected on
the other side. Its relevant Bell-CHSH inequality then
has the same form as derived by Garg and Mermin [16]:
SCHSH ≤ 4
η2,1
− 2, (15)
with η2,1 ≥ 2/3 [12]. The maximum value 2
√
2 predicted
by Quantum Mechanics for SCHSH [15] exceeds the right-
hand side of this inequality if η2,1 > 2(
√
2 − 1) ≈ 0.828.
It means a bound on this conditional efficiency of 82.8%
to invalidate local realism.
Now, assigning the same bound not just to the condi-
tional efficiency η2,1 but rather to the actual detection
efficiency η (which is what we have calculated above for
the double-blinding attack) is not immediate.
One can assume independent non-detection events, as
was done by Garg and Mermin [16], so that η = η2,1 and
the bound derived for the conditional efficiency η2,1 is
then valid just the same for the detection efficiency η.
In a case however in which the assumption of indepen-
dence is not fulfilled, as with the double-blinding attack,
the bound on the conditional efficiency η2,1 cannot be ex-
tended directly to the detection efficiency η. One needs to
use another inequality given by Larsson [12] between the
conditional efficiency and the detection efficiency, that is
η2,1 ≥ 2 − 1η , which leads to a less stringent Bell-CHSH
inequality, this time as a function of the detection effi-
ciency η:
SCHSH ≤ 2
2η − 1 , (16)
with η ≥ 3/4 [12]. The maximum value 2√2 predicted by
Quantum Mechanics for SCHSH exceeds the right-hand
side of this inequality if η > 1
4
(
√
2 + 2) ≈ 0.853. It
means a bound on the efficiency η of 85.3% to invalidate
local realism (and therefore a possible attack on Ekert
protocol).
Alice and Bob should therefore be wary of how exactly
they measure the efficiency in their Quantum key distri-
bution protocol.
If the number of emitted pair of pulses is unavailable to
them, they can only estimate the conditional efficiency,
by dividing the number of single counts by the number
of emitted pair of pulses, and the bound is indeed 82.8%.
In fact, in the double blinding-attack, their estimation of
the conditional efficiency would be equal to the familiar
bound, that is η2,1 =
pw
η
= 2(
√
2 − 1) ≈ 0.828, because
the probability to detect a pair is simply equal to the
probability pw to detect a weak pulse.
If however they know the number N of emitted pair of
pulses and can evaluate the detection efficiency directly,
by dividing the number of single counts by the number of
emitted pair of pulses, then the efficiency bound is 85.3%.
Finally, it should be noted that if detectors with a lower
efficiency are used, a simple way to deter the attack is to
implement a fair sampling test [18, 19].
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